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INCORPORATION BY LAW
Joseph Raz1
Balliol College, Oxford, and Columbia University
The truism that launched many theories about the nature of law—that law
is a social institution—leaves, not surprisingly, many questions unanswered.
One of the most important among them is the question of whether social
institutions or more generally social practices can be understood in entirely
nonevaluative terms.2 Not penetrating to the same degree the heart of our
understanding of law and of normative phenomena generally is another
question left open by the truism, a question much discussed in recent years,
namely, whether moral principles can become part of the law of a country
by “incorporation”.3 Though different, it may be thought that the two are
interconnected in certain ways.
My purpose here is to examine the question of how the law can be incorporated within morality and how the existence of the law can impinge
on our moral rights and duties, a question (or questions) which is a central
aspect of the broad question of the relation between law and morality. My
conclusions cast doubts on the incorporation thesis, that is, the view that
moral principles can become part of the law of the land by incorporation.

1. This article includes material presented as the first of three Storrs Lectures at Yale in
2003.
2. We lack a general term to refer collectively to all the concepts characteristic of practical
thought. These include concepts belonging to virtue and character-related concepts (courage,
etc.), responsibility-related concepts (excuses, etc.), value concepts (admirable, etc.), normative concepts (ought, etc.), and reason concepts (rational, etc.). In previous times “descriptive”
and “factual” were commonly used to designate those concepts that are not specifically practical. This, however, miscasts descriptions. (“This is John” is not a description of anything yet
is supposed to be a descriptive sentence.) Designating nonevaluative propositions “factual”
implies that there are no evaluative facts, which is false. I will use “evaluative” and “normative”
interchangeably to refer to all of them, as well as using them more narrowly to refer to items
of the subcategories indicated above.
3. That the idea is consistent with Hart’s account of the law was intimated by him in his
review of LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW in Hart, 78 HARVARD L. REV. 1281 (1965), repr.
in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 361 (1983), and reiterated in the
postscript to THE CONCEPT OF LAW 250 (1961), though neither time did Hart stop to explore
the meaning and implication of the idea; see David Lyons, Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory,
87 YALE L.J. 415 (1977), at 423–424, and Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge:
The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICHIGAN L. REV. 473 (1977). The point was embraced by Jules
Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982), and developed and
defended at length by him in JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001). See, for a
general discussion of the view, Kenneth E. Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (J. Coleman & S. Shapiro, eds., 2002).
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I. EVEN JUDGES ARE HUMANS

This way of putting the question is not meant to be neutral. Legal theorists
tend to start at the other end. They do not ask how law impinges upon
morality, but how morality impinges on the law. It may be natural for legal
theorists, being as they are focused on the law, to start with the law and ask
what room it makes for morality. I will suggest that this way of conceiving the
question of the relations between law and morality has contributed to some
important mistakes. A better way of motivating reflection on the relations
is to start with morality. That is why I have entitled this section “Even judges
are humans.” In being human, they are subject to morality. That is the only
fact the title is meant to convey.
A. The Scope of Morality
Why are judges, and humans generally, subject to morality? This is due to the
nature of morality. It has no doctrine of jurisdiction setting out its conditions
of application. It applies universally to all agents capable of understanding
it.4 Suppose that by the rules of the university, no one should use offensive
language about any member of the university. It makes sense to say: that rule
applies only to students of the university and not, say, to their parents, for
the university has no jurisdiction over the parents of its students. I do not
mean merely that it has no jurisdiction to discipline them if they break the
rule. I mean that it has no jurisdiction, no power to make rules applying to
them. It has no jurisdiction to bind them.
By way of contrast, let us suppose, for example, that morally, if I learn
about a person’s intentions in confidence I should not tell people about
them. If so, then it makes no sense to say: Morally speaking, I should not tell
people about his intention, but luckily morality does not apply to me. It has
no jurisdiction over me. If I know that it is morally wrong of me to tell people,
and so on, or even if I do not know it but can know it, then it does apply to me.
Some may think that morality has a doctrine of jurisdiction and that I
have just stated what I take it to be—morality applies to all agents who are
capable of understanding it. But this is a misunderstanding. Reasons are
considerations by which agents’ behavior is to be guided. They apply only
to agents who can, in principle,5 be aware of their existence, for otherwise
those agents cannot be guided by them. Hence the fact that moral reasons
apply to people and not to lions is not a result of any doctrine of jurisdiction,
nor is it a reflection of any aspect of the content of morality. It is simply a
consequence of the fact that moral reasons are reasons.6
4. And for agents, understanding it implies the capacity to be guided by it.
5. A weasel word disguising the difficulty of specifying the strength of the “can in principle”
in that condition.
6. Other moral properties, such as generosity and conscientiousness, apply to agents in
virtue of their propensity to react to moral reasons or the way they did or failed to do so
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To repeat, that is why judges are subject to morality. Morality, unlike the
law or the norms governing the university or any other social institution, is
not a system of rules. Talking of morality is just a way of talking of some of
the reasons that people have. They apply to whomever they address. Not all
moral reasons apply to everyone. Some apply to pregnant women only, some
to parents, some to teachers. Their scope of application is determined by
their content. If they are reasons to respect one’s children, then they apply
only to people who have children. When I say that judges being human
are willy-nilly subject to morality, I do not mean that all of them ought to
respect their children. Only those who have children ought to do so. That
goes without saying. It does not deny that they are all subject to morality.
B. On Points of View
I assume that no one denies that morality applies to judges. The question is
how to understand this statement. Some may say: of course morality applies
itself to judges; from the moral point of view, judges are morally bound
just like anyone else. But the moral point of view is just that—one point of
view among many. The question is whether morality applies to judges or to
others from, let us say, a prudential point of view; that is, whether it is in
their self-interest to be guided by morality. Or one may ask: Is it the law that
morality applies to judges? Are they legally bound to follow morality?
To examine the standing of such questions we need to spend a little
time looking at the notion of a normative point of view or a normative
perspective.7 Several uses of “a point of view” are helpful and unproblematic. They can be divided into two types. The first consists of discourse where
the effect of the qualification “from this and that point of view things are
thus and so” is to bracket the question of truth: from a Christian point of
view, or from a Kantian point of view, or from the point of view of cognitive
science things are thus and so—implying that if Christianity, or Kant’s theory, or cognitive science are true, then this is how things are, but without
committing to their truth.8 The second type of use isolates different aspects
of a problem, often as a way of helping with thinking about it and advancing
towards its solution. For example, we may say “from the economic point of
view it would be good for the university to close the philosophy department,
adequately. Some properties make objects or events morally fortunate or unfortunate, and they
may apply to things that are not moral agents, but they too ultimately derive their meaning
from their relations to circumstances in which rational agents confront choices.
7. The views that follow apply to nonnormative points of view as well, but I will not be
concerned to establish that.
8. Though of course one is committed to it being truly so from that point of view. Note
that the truth conditions of propositions from a point of view (so understood) are not the
same as those of the corresponding material implication; for example, “if Christian doctrine is
true then. . . .” For one thing, they assert not merely that the from-a-point-of-view proposition
is true but that (in this example) it is Christianity that is the ground of its truth. Besides, the
falsity of Christianity, far from guaranteeing the truth of the proposition, has no bearing on
the question of its truth.
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as its alumni rarely earn much money and the loss of their donations to the
university would not hurt it much; from an academic point of view, however,
this would not be justified.” We can then proceed to a decision of what would
be right, all things considered.
Discourse of any possible point of view can serve this second function, that
is, indicate that the considerations referred to need not be the only ones,
nor need they be the ones which carry the day.9 But there are some points
of view reference to which cannot be used to serve the first function, that of
suspending the question of truth. This is obvious if you think of artificially
defined or “made up” points of view such as “from the point of view of
valid reasons, you have reason to do this and that.” Valid reasons are real
reasons, and once you have committed yourself that you are talking about
valid reasons, you can no longer say “but I do not know if there is any reason
to do so.” Contrast this with “from a Catholic point of view, I ought to give
it to him.” Saying this need not imply belief that there is any reason for me
to give it to him. The Catholic point of view may be false, that is the specific
doctrines and beliefs of the Catholic Church may be false or, if true, only
accidentally true, that is, not true for the reasons Catholic doctrine gives
for them. So it is perfectly intelligible to say “from a Catholic point of view
you ought to give it to him, but I really do not know whether you have any
reason to do so.”
There are many terms that can indicate a point of view when used in
the second way but cannot indicate a point of view when we talk of the
suspension of the question of truth. For example, if I say “from the point of
view of my own interests, there are reasons for the first option,” my statement
is qualified by recognition of the possibility of other conflicting interests,
but I cannot continue my statement with “but I do not know whether there
is any reason at all for that option,” for I have already said that there are: my
interest furnishes reasons for it.
Morality is another perspective reference to which cannot be used to suspend truth. “Morality” is used to refer only to true or valid considerations.
In saying this, I do merely clarify the sense in which I will use the term. While
it is the sense in which it is used when considering the relations of law and
morality, it is not the only sense in which people use the term. When Dolittle
answers Pickering’s reprimand “Have you no morals, man?” with “I can’t afford them,”10 he suggests that morals, like breeding, are fineries that only the
moneyed classes can afford. But that is not the way the term will be used here.
C. The Legal and the Moral Points of View
Sometimes, when reasons for and against an action conflict, there is no rational determination to the conflict. Neither of the conflicting reasons defeats
the other. Most commonly this is the case when the conflicting reasons are
9. Barring some artificial creations such as “from the decisive point of view.”
10. G.B. SHAW, PYGMALION, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF BERNARD SHAW 729 (1934).
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incommensurate. Not uncommonly incommensurate reasons arise out of
diverse values. Sometimes, for example, there is no right answer to the question of whether it is now more important for the government to increase
its investments in education or in health services. These are familiar facts,
born out by analysis.
Some people, including some philosophers, go further and assume that
there is never a rational way of concluding what one may, all told, do when
reasons of certain different kinds, say moral reasons and reasons of selfinterest, point in different directions. If from a moral point of view one ought
to take an action that self-interested reasons indicate one should avoid, then
there is no conclusion regarding what one ought to do, all things told. Some
people assume that that is so when legal and moral reasons are concerned.11
These claims involve two mistakes. They suppose that it is rational to
perform an action, that is, that it is rationally alright to perform an action,
only if reason requires its performance (in the sense that entails that there
are reasons for it that defeat all reasons against it). On this view, it is not
rational to pick a tin of Heinz baked bins from a supermarket shelf unless
it is the only tin of its kind. If there are more than one placed conveniently,
then there is no more reason to choose one of them than to choose any of
the others, and therefore it is not alright, rationally speaking, to choose any.
This is obviously absurd. It is rationally alright to perform an action so long
as the reasons for it are not defeated, for example, so long as the reasons
against it are not more stringent. Therefore, if an action is favored by one
reason and opposed by another and neither of them defeats the other, then
it is right both to perform the action and to refrain from it, and that is so
whether or not the two conflicting reasons belong to the same point of view
or to different points of view.12
The second mistake is the assumption that legal and moral reasons constitute points of view in the same way. Whatever else the law is, it consists,
at least in part, in man-made norms, that is, it takes itself to impose duties
on people and to do so in virtue of decisions taken by governmental institutions with the intention of imposing duties on people, including people
other than those taking the decisions.
Some people tend to think that in democratic countries people are bound
only by laws that they themselves made. But those who live in democratic
countries know that they are bound by laws made a hundred years before
they were born and that their children are bound by laws that they had no say
in, and they themselves are bound by laws whether or not they participated
in the process leading to their enactment, let alone being bound by them
whether or not they supported or opposed them.
11. This may have been Hart’s view in his later work; see H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM
(1983).
12. The only alternative I can see is to deny that reasons which belong to a point of view
have any bearing on what one ought to do, all told. But if so, it is not clear in what sense they
are reasons at all.
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It is well understood that no one can impose a duty on another just by
expressing his will that the other have that duty. If governments can do so,
this can only be because and to the extent that there are valid principles that
establish their right to do so. Those principles, the principles establishing
the legitimacy of man-made laws and of the governments that make them,
are themselves, whatever else they are, moral principles. They may also be
principles deriving from people’s self-interest. For example, Hobbesians
think that all morality derives from self-interest and that all moral principles
are also principles of indirect self-interest. They may also be legal principles.
I do not wish to prejudge the question of what does and what does not belong
to the law. All I am saying is that whether or not the principles that endow
governments with legitimacy are legal principles, they are moral principles.
How do we know that? By their content. They are principles that allow,
perhaps even require, some people to interfere in important ways in the
lives of others. Valid principles that have such content are moral principles,
or nothing is. I do not believe that morality is a unified systematic body of
principles. But whatever else we grace with the title “moral,” principles that
impose, or give people power to impose on others, duties affecting central
areas of life are moral principles. That much about the nature of morality
is clear.
The result is that we cannot conceive of the law as a normatively valid point
of view contrasting with morality. Perhaps it is possible to think of reasons
of self-interest as a distinct point of view contrasting with that of morality.
But that, if possible, is possible only because self-interest is thought to be a
ground of reasons independently of morality. It is not similarly possible to
think of the law as a ground of reasons independently of morality. Given that
much of it is man-made, at least man-made legal duties bind their subjects
only if moral principles of legitimacy make them so binding.
We can of course suspend judgment on whether the law is binding on its
subjects, on whether legal rules do provide anyone with the reasons they
purport to establish. We can thus treat the law as a normative point of view
in the way in which we might treat Muslim morality as a distinct normative
point of view, that is, if it is legitimate or valid, then we have the reasons that,
according to it, we have. But in that sense the law does not conflict with any
other normative considerations, since when so treated, it is not assumed that
it includes or creates any normative considerations.

D. The Law Presupposing Morality
Far be it for me to claim that all legal systems do enjoy moral legitimacy,
which means that legal duties are really duties binding on people rather
than being the demands governments impose on people. All I am saying
is that when it is assumed that any legal system is legitimate and binding,
that it does impose the duties it purports to impose—and I will generally
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proceed in this discussion on the assumption that the legal systems we are
considering enjoy such legitimacy—in such cases we cannot separate law
from morality as two independent normative points of view, for the legal
one derives what validity it has from morality.
This, then, is finally the full answer to the question of why judges are humans too,
why they are subject to morality: they would not be subject to the law were they not
subject to morality.
Let this reply not be misinterpreted: it does not deny that we can discuss
and describe the law from a detached point of view. We can talk of a legal
system that is practiced in a country and of its requirements and implications
without making any assumption that they have normative standing.13 Such
discourse, free of the assumption of the normative standing of the law, is the
equivalent of talking of what people demand of others without implying that
these demands have any normative standing, that the others have reason to
comply with them as they are intended to do. But—and this is my point—
where the law is normatively valid, it is so in virtue of a moral principle,
and therefore if we take the law to be normatively valid we cannot construe its
requirements as constituting a point of view independent of morality, a point of view
that represents a separate normative concern that has nothing to do with morality,
and then ask whether it recognizes morality as applying to its officials. The boot
is on the other foot; the question is whether morality, which applies to all
humans simply because they are humans, has room for the law. How can
morality accommodate the law within it?
II. THE PUZZLES OF SO-CALLED “INCORPORATION”
A. The Puzzle
But before we turn to examine this question (which can only be examined
cursorily in this article), it is fitting to consider some questions that the
truism that judges are human, and as such subject to morality, may raise. I
argued that we cannot counter the claim that judges are subject to morality
by saying that from a moral point of view they are, but not necessarily from
a legal one. For the legal point of view cannot be contrasted with morality
in that way. If they are bound by law, that is because they are morally bound
by it. Morality comes first. Does it mean that it is the law that judges are
subject to morality? In a way I want to say that that does not make sense. The
law cannot empower morality. It is the other way round. It is empowered
by morality. But it would be wrong to leave matters at that. Surely the law
can instruct judges not to follow morality, and it can instruct them to follow
it, and it can do either or both in more discriminating ways. That is, it can
instruct judges to decide some issue by reference to morality and not to do
so in other cases, or to decide some cases with special reference to some
13. I take this view to have been Kelsen’s position.
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parts or aspects of morality, for example, fairness between the parties, or
the public interest in safety, and so on.
In other words, how does the view that judges are humans too square with
legislation or precedents that at least appear to exclude morality or with
legislation or precedents that appear to incorporate morality?
B. Exclusion before Inclusion
As it turns out, inclusion is made possible by the ability of the law legitimately
to exclude and modify the application of morality. So let us start with a
few remarks regarding exclusion. Tempted to be provocative rather than
accurate, one may say that the very existence of the law, even of morally
legitimate law, means the exclusion of morality. Think about it: judges are
bound by morality. So, absent any law, they would decide the case on the
basis of moral considerations. Does it not follow that where there is law, it
either makes no difference to their decisions or it forces them to deviate
from what they would do on the basis of morality alone—that it in effect
excludes morality? Is it not the case that whenever the law makes a difference
to the outcome, it excludes morality? If it is the purpose of the law to make
a difference to our life, does it not follow that its realization of its purpose
depends on its ability to exclude morality?
Few people endorse the view that the law purports to make no difference
to what we should do. But no one feels embarrassed by my paradoxical
inference. First of all, it will be pointed out that the law is binding, by my
own admission, only if it is morally legitimate. (I do not, of course, mean
that only then is it legally binding. I mean that to say that it is legally binding
implies that it claims to be morally binding, and that it is binding only if it is
morally binding, and that it is taken to be binding as it claims to be only by
those thinking it to be morally binding). To repeat, the law is binding only if
morally legitimate. It would follow that if it is both legitimate and excludes
morality, there is no problem, for the exclusion is morally permissible.
It may be relevant here to mention that morality is not a seamless web that
is either in or out. We simply refer to some of the myriad considerations that
apply to us as moral considerations not because they have a common origin
or purpose or some systemic unity but simply on account of their content,
for example, that they are considerations requiring us to take notice of the
interests of others, regardless of our own aims and interests. For value pluralists it is a commonplace that moral considerations conflict in a variety
of ways, that right action requires compromises between various moral concerns, and that sometimes it requires edging some out in favor of others.
When we think of the special responsibilities of judges, we are reminded
that they are analogous in some respects to the special responsibilities of
teachers, doctors, parents, friends, and others, in that each one of those
roles requires prioritizing some moral concerns at the expense of others.
The rights and duties of a doctor vis-à-vis his or her patients are different
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from the rights and duties we have vis-à-vis strangers, and they partly displace
them. There are ways of acting that are permissible between strangers but
not between doctor and patient.
I am not suggesting that the way the law affects the application of morality
is closely analogous to the way roles, such as those of doctors or lawyers, affect
it. I bring up the analogy simply to illustrate the more general point, namely
that the application of abstract moral principles is affected and modified by
special institutional arrangements such as roles. I have previously tried to
describe the way the presence of legitimate authorities affects the application
of moral principles14 and will be brief and schematic here.
It is time to abandon the dramatic metaphor of the law excluding morality.
What happens—and remember, we are talking here of morally legitimate
law only—is that the law modifies the way morality applies to people. True,
the result is that some moral considerations that apply absent the law do
not apply or do not apply in the same way. But barring mistakes and other
malfunctioning that can occur even within a just and legitimate system, the
law modifies rather than excludes the way moral considerations apply and,
in doing so, advances, all things considered, moral concerns rather than
undermines them.
I will mention three ways in which this happens. First, the law concretizes
general moral considerations, determining, for those to whom it applies,
what bearing these considerations have on their lives. It takes away from
individuals the right and the burden of deciding in various circumstances
how morality bears on the situation—what exactly it requires. For example, what form of dealings in a company’s shares is proper for its directors
or employees; what information need a doctor disclose to a patient before the patient’s consent can count as voluntary and binding on him or
her.
Second, in giving moral considerations concrete and public form, the
law also makes their relatively uniform and relatively assured enforcement
possible, making reliance on them more secure and preventing unfairness
in relations between conformers and nonconformers.
Third, it makes moral goals and morally desirable conditions easier to
achieve and sometimes it makes possible what would be impossible without
it.15 The simplest and most written-about way in which the law achieves such
goals revolves around its ability to secure coordinated conduct that solves, so
to speak, what are known as coordination problems and prisoner’s dilemma
problems. But there is much more to this story than these relatively simple tales. Even fairly straightforward legal institutions, such as contract law,
enable the creation of business relationships that would not exist outside
institutional contexts. Needless to say, neither corporations nor intellectual
property could exist, except in rudimentary ways, outside the law. These
14. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, chs. 2–4 (1993).
15. That is, without some institutional background, not necessarily without this legal system.

10

JOSEPH RAZ

may be taken to illustrate the ability of the law to facilitate desirable economic relations and activities. But they and other legal institutions do much
more. They made the whole urban civilization as we have known it over the
last century or two possible—large numbers of people living with relative
anonymity side by side, enjoying freedoms and rich civic amenities together
and at the same time separately, each by her or himself, an urban civilization
of the kind the world has not known before and is unlikely to enjoy for much
longer.
C. When Is Incorporation not Incorporation?
There is much more to be said about the ways the law modifies morality by
making the realization of ideals possible. But let me turn to the question of
so-called incorporation. Article 1(1) of the German Constitution provides:
“Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all
state authority.” The first amendment of the U.S. Constitution says, among
other things, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech,” assuming, as it is generally assumed, that the freedom of speech
referred to in it is not the freedom of speech existing in the common law
before the passing of the Bill of Rights, but a moral right to free speech.
This Amendment, too, is often taken as an example of the incorporation of
morality by law.
Such instances of apparent incorporation raise the obvious question:
What effect can they have, given that judges are subject to morality anyway?
Before I consider it, let me answer another question which my terminology
was bound to raise: Why do I call these cases “instances of apparent incorporation”? Are they not clear instances of incorporation? The answer is that
they are not. That is, they are not cases of incorporation if “incorporation”
means legislating or otherwise making a standard into a law of the relevant
legal system by a rule that refers to it and gives it some legal effect.
U.K. and U.S. statutes give legal effect to company regulations, to university statutes, and to many other standards without making them part of
the law of the United Kingdom or the United States. Conflict-of-law doctrines give effect to foreign law without making it part of the law of the land.
Such references make the application of the standards referred to legally
required, and rights and duties according to law include thereafter rights
and duties determined by those standards. But they do not make those standards part of the law. They no more become part of the law of the land than
do legally binding contracts, which are also binding according to law and
change people’s rights and duties without being themselves part of the law
of the land.
There are many diverse forms of giving effect to standards by reference
to them. An interesting, relatively recent example illustrating that diversity
is the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 2000, which states in its first
article:
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1. (1) In this Act “the Convention rights” means the rights and fundamental
freedoms set out in—
(a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention,
(b) Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and
(c) Articles 1 and 2 of the Sixth Protocol,
as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention.
(2) Those Articles are to have effect for the purposes of this Act subject to
any designated derogation or reservation.

Does this article make “the convention rights” part of U.K. law? Its language
is cautious and qualified. The rest of the act specifies what legal effects the
rights have in U.K. law. For example, Article 3 states:
3. (1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible
with the Convention rights.
(2) This section—
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted;
(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement
of any incompatible primary legislation; and
(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement
of any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any
possibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of
the incompatibility.

Had a statute said “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is
compatible with the edicts of the Pope or with the writings of Kant,” we
would not have been in the least tempted to think that through it either the
edicts of the Pope or the writings of Kant have become parts of the law of the
land, though beyond doubt they would have been given by that imagined
act some legal effect.
I think that the cumulative effect of the various articles of the Human
Rights Act entitles one to say that it incorporates “convention rights” into
U.K. law, that is, that U.K. law now includes those rights.16 But I hope that
these remarks show that decision on this issue is not straightforward and
that not everything which looks like incorporation is incorporation. They
also show that the difference between making a standard part of the law
and merely giving it some legal effect without making it in itself part of
the law of the land does not lie in the language of the “incorporating”
16. Though they do not have the same effect or force in U.K. law as if they were enacted in a
straightforward way nor the same effect that they have in other countries that have embraced
the European Convention on Human Rights.
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legislative measure—that it depends in part on our general conception of
what a legal system is and how it relates to normative standards outside it,
such as foreign law, moral considerations, or the constitution and laws of
nonstate organisations.
Perhaps I should add that the distinction between what is part of the law
and what are standards binding according to law but not themselves part
of the law is particularly vague. That is not surprising given that we do not
often need to rely on it. Though sometimes there are procedural differences
regarding, say, judicial notice and rules of evidence and of presentation that
do or do not apply to standards that are part of the law or merely enforceable
according to law, much of the time the practical implications of a standard
are the same either way. That is not to say that we can dispense with the
distinction or that it is of no importance. So long as we maintain that what is
required according to law is made so by law, we cannot dispense with it, and
so long as the law maintains its place at the heart of the political organization
of society and remains a focus of attitudes of identification and alienation,
the distinction has an importance way beyond any legal technicalities.
I believe that so-called “incorporating” reference to morality belongs, with
conflicts-of-law doctrines, to a nonincorporating form of giving standards
legal effect without turning them into part of the law of the land. To see
the reasons for this view, we need first to examine the legal effect of such
references.

D. So-Called Incorporation as Modulated Exclusion
So back to the main question: What is the point of provisions giving effect
to moral considerations if judges are subject to morality anyway? The point
is that such references help the law modulate its intervention in and modification of the way moral considerations affect us. I will use three examples
to make the point. As a general rule the law, as we have seen, can modify
the application of moral principles to its subjects. The law is, however, a
complex institution, a complex set of institutions. Which legal organs have
such powers? As a general rule, all lawmaking institutions have the power to
modify moral considerations and can use this power whenever they make
new law. In fact the making of law implies the use of such powers.17 So-called
“incorporation” of morality modulates the application of this general rule.
My first example has to do with the truism that the lawmaking functions
are unequally distributed among various bodies. Some are federal and some
are state, some legislative and some judicial, some are superior to others. All
17. Qualifications are in place here for a law may be newly made yet old in content, being a
mere restatement of “old” law, and it can, though more rarely than we tend to imagine, merely
restate moral precepts as they are without any modification and without any implications
(for the process of enforcement and implementation) that modify the application of moral
considerations.
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such divisions imply limits on the lawmaking powers of some institutions.
One way in which they are set is by establishing a conflict rule prioritizing the
rules made by one body over those of others when the two conflict. Hence
Congress cannot make law which is at odds with the Constitution. When
the Constitution “incorporates” a moral consideration, such as freedom of
speech, it sets limits to the power of Congress and other lawmakers to modify
this aspect of morality. References to moral considerations in constitutions
are typically not cases of the incorporation of morality but blocks to its
exclusion or modification by ordinary legislation.
My second example concerns the common practice of coupling such constitutional provisions with judicial review. Judicial review not only makes the
block to the exclusion or modification of constitutionally protected moral
considerations by legislation enforceable; in addition in conferring on the
courts powers to enforce that block, it gives them, when adjudicating on the
compatibility of legislation with the constitutionally protected moral considerations, the power to modify the application of those moral considerations
themselves. So a second use of so-called incorporation of morality into law
is to allocate powers among lawmaking institutions.
Legislative reference to moral considerations has various other legal functions. My third and last example is again both typical and simple. It is the
legal equivalent of the multistage decision procedure we are all familiar with
in our lives. When I was last looking to move house, my final decision to buy
and move to the apartment where I now live was not taken all at once but
in stages. At least three are easily discernible. First, I decided how much I
could afford to spend. Then, in light of that decision and other factors, I
decided on the neighborhood in which to buy an apartment. Finally, I collected information about available accommodation within my price range
in the chosen neighborhood and chose the one to buy on the basis of a
whole slate of functional and esthetic considerations. Each of the first two
stages terminated with a partial decision about what apartment to buy (an
apartment costing no more than about . . . , an apartment in this neighborhood) that narrowed the options I considered in the next stage. Each stage
brought to bear considerations that did not play a part in the previous stage
(or played only an indirect part). And, crucially, each stage terminated my
deliberations about the impact of some reasons, which were not revisited in
the later stages. We resort to multistaged decision procedures often. They
make life simpler, improving our ability to reach reasonable decisions.
Institutions have additional reasons to use such procedures. Some institutions are better than others in assessing some aspects of the decision.
Political accountability demands that certain institutions will take part in
the decision, but they are too burdened with work to be able to consider
it thoroughly. It may be best to let them set a framework that will be filled
out by others. Some of the information that may be helpful will not be available until nearer the time when deciding from scratch will no longer be
rationally possible, and sometimes it may be advisable to delay some aspects
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of a decision until nearer the time of its implementation. Typically we find
that such considerations furnish at least part of the justification for delegating legislative or regulatory powers to subordinate bodies and agencies
and to the courts. Such delegation occurs whenever a standard is set but
is to be implemented in a way that is sensitive to certain moral concerns,
for example, the doctrine of contract determines who can make them and
under what conditions they are valid but adds that contracts against public
policy will not be enforceable, delegating to the courts a residual power to
set aside contracts on grounds of public policy.
References to morality in this context indicate to the courts or the regulatory agencies or delegated legislature that while the maker of the law has
considered moral and other considerations and found that they justify the
legislated standards, it did not consider, or did not exhaustively consider,
the impact of the so-called incorporated moral considerations, and it is for
the court or regulator and so on to do that.18 Again, what appears as incorporation is no more than an indication that certain considerations are not
excluded. The courts cannot gainsay the legislation and set it aside because
they think that a better standard should be endorsed. The legislation bars
them from doing so. It in effect excludes their access to the moral considerations on which the legislator should have relied in passing the act. But
they can supplement or modify the standard set by the act in light of the
nonexcluded considerations.
To conclude, judges are humans, and they are subject to morality without
any special incorporation of morality, as are we all. What appear as incorporation are various instances of nonexclusion.
III. INCLUSIVE POSITIVISM AND THE BOUNDARIES
OF LAW
The discussion and conclusions of this article relate to one of the oldest
and most important questions in our quest to understand the nature of
the law: the question of its relation to morality. One of its aspects is the
question of the boundaries of law, and especially the boundary between
law and morality. I tried, in the course of the discussion above, to avoid
prejudging that issue, the question of the boundary between what is and what
is not part of the law. My preliminary remarks on “so-called incorporation”
explain why the problem of the boundaries of law is an unprofitable focus
for a jurisprudential discussion. Yet I also remarked that the distinction
18. A very simple illustration (drawn to my attention by T. Endicott) is in practice direction
25.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules (in the U.K.) which says: “The court may make an order for
security for costs under rule 25.12 if (a) it is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances
of the case, that it is just to make such an order.” Clearly it might just as well have said “the
court may, in its discretion, make an order for security for costs. . . .” In that case, too, the court
would have had to do what is just. The language of the rule merely reminds courts that their
discretion was not curtailed. It does not “incorporate” anything.
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between what does and what does not belong to the law is inescapable, an
inescapable conclusion of any sensible theory of the law. It is worth dwelling
a little further on the nature of the problem and its difficulties.
As noted above, for the courts the difference between standards they
have to apply because they are the law of the land and those they have to
apply “merely” according to law often makes no practical difference, with
the consequence that they do not bother to establish sharp boundaries
to the notions. It is true that that is not always the case. Standards such
as foreign law, rules of other organizations, private agreements, and their
like sometimes occasion the application of different rules of evidence, or of
procedure, or general doctrines constraining the validity of one kind of rules
and not of others (e.g., being subject to federal constitutional doctrines if
but only if they are the law of the land, or being subject to public policy
doctrines only if they are not). For people whose thinking about the law is
focused exclusively on the practice of the courts, it may appear that that is
all that can matter to anyone. They may doubt that the distinction is needed
at all. To the extent that we find it in our thinking about the law, in our
legal practices, it is, they would claim, of mere local interest and without any
theoretical significance.
The law is, however, not merely a set of guides for court decisions. It is a
political institution of great importance to the working of societies and to
their members. From this point of view a British person cannot say “Polish
law is my law” just because it will be followed by British courts when their
conflict-of-law rules direct them to do so. The distinction between standards
that the courts have to apply and those that are the law of the land is vital
to our ability to identify the law as the political institution it is.
Vital distinctions are not necessarily sharp ones. It may be that in many
cases we have to resist the temptation to adjudicate whether a matter is part
of the law or merely to be followed according to law. It makes no difference,
we may say. You could take it either way. Or we may feel that neither view
can strictly be proclaimed to be correct.
Is not the so-called incorporation of morality a case of this kind, where
it is six of one or half dozen of the other? On the contrary, it seems to me
that the question of the status of the incorporation of morality provides a
good case study showing the need to attend sometimes to the question of
the boundaries of the law and the way that need arises only in the service of
other issues, rather than because there is an inherent importance in fixing
such boundaries for their own sake.
When the question is the relation between law and morality, it seems
inevitable that different claims about this relationship will imply different
demarcations of the boundary of law, at least in the interface between it and
morality.19 So long as we allow that it is possible for a population not to be
19. Of course, a society or a culture that does not have the concepts of morality and of law
does not have a view about their demarcation. Such a society may even be subject to law. The
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governed by law, there must be a difference between legal standards and
those which are not legal, not part of the law. If a population has law, then it
has a normative system that can fail to exist.20 Morality, on the other hand,
cannot fail to exist or to apply. Moreover, in any country subject to law there
are moral rights and duties that are not legal rights and duties, or at least
there can be such. Hence there is a boundary between law and morality.
Hence there are boundaries to the law.
A simple-minded view has it that the law is marked by its connection with
certain institutions and that there are two ways in which it is so connected:
first, only standards, norms, enacted or endorsed by certain institutions
(law-making institutions, among them courts) are law and they are law because they are so endorsed. Second, only standards, norms, that apply to
certain institutions (law-applying institutions, among them courts) are law.
Any theory that endorses the simple view will tend to regard the connection between law and morality as largely contingent, though it need not and
should not deny that there are some necessary connections between law and
morality.
The main alternatives to the simple view abandon the first condition of
legal validity. They find only one necessary connection between law and
social institutions, the connection to law-applying institutions, with almost
always an exclusive concentration on the courts. There is a large number
of possible variations on that theme. One could, for example, argue that
the law consists of all the norms that the simple view acknowledges but in
addition contains also the moral principles that apply to the conduct of legal
institutions, such as courts. Rules such as audi alteram partem, for example,
are, on this view, part of perhaps every legal system, regardless of whether
they are followed in it or not and regardless of whether they were made
into law by its legal institutions, simply because it is a moral norm binding
on institutions such as courts of law. Another variant of this approach holds
that the law consists of all the norms that the courts ought to apply. These
may include those standards that the simple view recognizes, and they may
include the moral standards that apply to the courts. But they include more,
namely, standards regardless of whom they apply to, which the courts have
a moral duty to follow, or something like that.
Both alternatives to the simple view allow that moral norms are part of
the law just because they are moral norms, yet both—and they are just
two prototypes among many—respect the institutional nature of the law
by acknowledging that moral norms are part of the law only if they are
connected specifically to legal institutions. The views known as inclusive
existence of a legal system in any country does not depend on the possession of the concept
of law by the population of that country. But it does not follow, of course, that in that country
there is no boundary demarcating the limits of law, distinguishing between what is part of it
and what is not. The argument in the text applies to it as well.
20. I rely on the view that the law exists, where it does, as a normative system; that is, that
there are no single, stand-alone laws that are not part of a normative system.
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legal positivism seem to be closer to the simple view in that like it they insist
on the dual connection between legal institutions and legal standards—
legal standards are made so by legal institutions as well as being applied
and enforced by legal institutions. In fact, they can lay claim to being pure
advocates of the simple view: if, according to them, a legal standard requires
appropriate sections of the population to follow it and the courts to apply a
certain standard, then it is part of the law. And if the legal standard socalled incorporates moral standards, then those moral standards are part
of the law. If there is a law that stipulates that one ought, in all dealings
with people to whom one does not owe special responsibility, to observe
all the moral requirements that apply to dealings between strangers, then
the moral standards setting out these requirements have become part of the
law. I will call this version of inclusive legal positivist thesis the incorporation
thesis.21
The conclusions of the earlier part of this article pose a difficulty for the
incorporation thesis. If morality applies to people and courts alike anyway,
then we are all, courts included, bound by it even before its incorporation. In
what way can incorporation turn it into law? The fact that the incorporation
thesis is the purest expression of the simple view counts against it rather than
being a point in its favor. We know that the simple view is too simple. We know
that Polish law is not part of Greek law just because Greek conflict-of-law
rules direct people and courts to follow Polish law on certain occasions.
The incorporation thesis claims that moral standards turn into law simply
because of their incorporation. It seems to lack the resources to distinguish
between law directing us and the courts to follow some foreign law or to obey
the rules of some associations, and so on, and the incorporation of morality.
In fact it has a special difficulty with the latter, for morality applies anyway,
and the incorporation thesis suggests that it applies only if incorporated.
The argument of this article has shown that so-called incorporating laws
have their point—that their effect is not to incorporate but rather to prevent the exclusion of morality by law. This deprives the incorporation thesis
of another possible argument, namely, that it alone can make sense of the
existence of laws that appear to incorporate moral standards. On the contrary, it cannot explain their function. Given that morality applies anyway,
their function cannot be to incorporate it. None of this proves that the incorporation thesis is false. But it raises serious doubts about it, doubts that
its supporters have not yet confronted successfully.22

21. These remarks apply only to what Himma, supra, note 3, calls the sufficiency condition
of inclusive legal positivism, that is, to the view that so-called “incorporation” can turn morality
into law. I do not, in this article, consider in any way the case for or against the view that the
validity of legal norms may depend, whether because some other law so determines or for other
reasons, on them being consistent with some nonlegal norms, moral or other.
22. I raised essentially the same question in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 47, note 8 (1979), though
I did so rather briefly and without the supporting arguments above.

